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SKIPPER v. FRENCH

130 F.3d 603 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On August 25, 1990, Sherman Elwood Skipper fatally
shot Ailene Pittman and Nelson Fipps, Jr., Pittman's eighteen year old grandson, in front of Pittman's home.' Skipper
and a companion, Mark Smith, had been drinking beer for a
lengthy period of time prior to showing up at Pittman's
home. Skipper and Pittman had been dating, and Skipper
went to Pittman's with the intention of talking to her. After
talking for approximately fifteen minutes in Pittman's front
yard, Skipper returned to his truck. At this point, Pittman
told Smith, who was in the driver's seat, not to bring
Skipper to her house anymore. 2 As Smith was starting to
pull away, Skipper reached behind the front seat of the
truck, and pulled out a .223 semiautomatic rifle.3 The rifle
was loaded with a particular kind of U.S.Army ammunition
known for its "'effective wounding potential." 4 Skipper
fired three shots at Pittman, killing her.
After a brief pause, Skipper turned the gun on Fipps
and fired twice.' According to the record, Skipper then
asked Smith,"did I get them," and then the two men departed to discard the weapon.6 Skipper and Smith evaded the
authorities for almost a week before Smith turned himself
into the Columbus County Sheriff's Department. After
Smith revealed Skipper's whereabouts, the police captured
7
Skipper who was then indicted for first-degree murder.
The procedural posture of Skipper's case is lengthy and
complex, but a recitation of it is necessary to understanding
the decision. Skipper did not put on any evidence at his
jury trial in Bladen County Superior Court." After the court
declined to give a defense-requested instruction on seconddegree murder as a lesser-included offense, the jury had to
choose between guilty and not guilty of first-degree murder
only. The jury chose the former, finding Skipper guilty of
the first-degree murders of Pittman and Fipps. During the
sentencing phase, the State submitted the following: (1)
Skipper's prior conviction of three felony assaults with a
deadly weapon;9 and (2) a "course of conduct" factor given

'Skipper v. French, 130 E3d 603,605 (4th Cir. 1997).
FSkippe, 130 E3d at 605.
3
1d. at 605.
4Id at 605.
Id. at 605. According to the record, before firing the weapon
at Fipps, Skipper stated,"you too'
6
Skipper,130 E3d at 605.
7

1d. at 605.

MId. at 605.
9
These convictions included the defendant's stabbing of his
then wife, nearly severing her thumb, and the defendant's shooting of his brother in the back with a .22 caliber rifle. Id.at 605.

the proximity of two or more violent acts in the commission of a crime. 10 In response,the defense presented the following mitigating evidence: (1) Skipper had previously
been institutionalized for a drinking problem; (2) he would
go on drinking binges and remain intoxicated for long periods of time; and (3) he had been dropped on his head as a
child." The jury imposed death sentences for both murders. 2
After giving notice of appeal to the North Carolina
Supreme Court and having his stay of execution granted,
Skipper filed an appeal which raised thirty-one state and
federal claims. In affirming the convictions and death sentences, the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected all of
the federal claims." On January 23, 1995, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Almost four months later,
under North Carolina's"motion for appropriate relief,"'4 the
court appointed counsel for Skipper in order to seek postconviction relief. At this time, Skipper's stay of execution
was extended to October 16, 1995. Two months later, in
June of 1995, Skipper sought an ex parte hearing on a
motion for funds to procure a mental-health expert who
specialized in mental retardation." The court denied the
defendant's motion and moved the execution date back to
November 16, 1995.
In an effort to challenge the court's denial of a hearing
on the petition for funds, defense counsel then filed a petition for writ of certiorari and writ of supersedeas in the

"Skipper, 130 E3d at 605-06.
'lid. at 606. Dr.Antonin E. Puente, a neuropsychology expert,
testified that Skipper had a history of head injury, alcohol abuse,
and antisocial behavior. According to Puente, Skipper was functionally illiterate, his IQ was 69 (equivalent of a six year old), and
he suffered from impaired memory,mental retardation, and a moderate to severe brain syndrome. Moreover, Puente found that
Skipper neither understood the wrongfulness of his actions nor
possessed the capacity to follow the law. Id. at 606.
2Id. at 606.
13Skippe, 130 F3d at 606.
"N.C. Gen. stat. § 15A-1401-1420 (1997). Under North
Carolina law, a motion for appropriate relief provides a single, unified procedure for raising, at the trial level, errors which are asserted to have been made during the trial. By definition, a motion for
appropriate relief is a post-verdict motion (or post-sentencing
motion where there is no verdict) made to correct errors occurring prior to, during, and after a criminal trial. State v.Handy, 391
S.E.2d 159 (1990). A motion for appropriate relief can be compared to an "assignment of errors" in Virginia law, though the former is addressed at the trial level, and the latter is dealt with at the
appellate level.
"Skippe, 130 E3d at 606.
16Id. at 606.
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North Carolina Supreme Court. 6 After this petition was
denied, defense counsel spoke to the judge who had
presided over the post-conviction proceedings, and requested a continuation of the stay of execution which was supposed to expire the next morning. 17 After consulting with
the Assistant Attorney General, who objected to extending
the stay, the judge decided to deny the defense motion. He
called Skipper's counsel to tell him, and counsel asked the
judge whether he should file a motion for appropriate relief
the next day 8 The judge told counsel that he was not deciding any other motion, but that defense counsel "'was proceeding under the statute addressing Motions for
Appropriate Relief without limitation as to time or some
language to that effect"' 9
The next day,with no new execution date having been
set, Skipper appealed the order and petitioned the state
supreme court for reconsideration of its denial of certiorari. On November 20, 1995, still with no new established
execution date, Skipper was given notice of a hearing to
set a new execution date and an order to show cause why
counsel should not be held in contempt given the failure
to file a timely motion for appropriate relief.20 Less than a
month later, at the hearing on the execution date, the State
surprised defense counsel by withdrawing the show-cause
order and moving orally for the setting of a new execution
date and an order prohibiting Skipper from raising any
claims by use of the motion for appropriate relief in the
state courts. 2' The court, without any legal basis, granted
the State's motion, issuing an order procedurally barring
Skipper from using the motion for appropriate relief. In
addition, the court set the execution date for February 10,
1996.
Skipper appealed the order and attached a motion for
appropriate relief to his petition for certiorari, contending
that the motion was incomplete because of the deficiency
of requested mental-health experts.2 The attached motion
raised seven federal constitutional claims in addition to
those raised on direct appeal. The state supreme court
granted the petition as a means of entering an order
addressing the attached motion for appropriate relief. In its
order, the court stated that it had reviewed all the issues
raised in the motion and found no grounds sufficient to
require an evidentiary hearing or afford relief.23
Skipper then filed motions for a stay of execution and
the appointment of federal habeas counsel in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina. 24 The court granted both motions, and later, additionally granted motions for funds to retain a psychiatrist

17id. at 606.The record concerning the judge's actions is based
on an affidavit submitted by the judgeJack Hooks,Jr.
'8id. at 606.
"9Skippe, 130 E3d at 606 (quoting J-4- 93).
-IId
at 606.
2
'Id.at 607.
2Id.at 607.
2'Skipper, 130 E3d at 607.
24
1d. at 607.

and a second mental-health expert. On April 15, 1996, the
defendant timely filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus, submitting both the seven federal claims raised in the
attached motion for appropriate relief and twenty-one of
the federal claims raised on direct appeal (but not in the
motion for appropriate relief). The district court granted
the State's motion for summary judgment, finding that all
of the claims had been procedurally defaulted, and that no
showing of cause and prejudice had been made. In making
its findings, the district court did not differentiate in its
review between the seven claims raised in the motion for
appropriate relief and the twenty-one claims raised on
direct appeal. 2 The district court determined that neither
the state supreme court nor the state superior court considered the merits of Skipper's motion for appropriate26
relief because both relied on a state procedural bar.
Although the district court's order denied all of Skipper's
claims as procedurally defaulted, its analysis did not consider any state court decision with regard to the twentyone claims raised on direct appeal, instead only looking to
the seven federal claims raised in the motion for appropriate relief. Skipper then appealed the district court's order
to the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, raising the issue of whether the district court properly ruled
that all of the federal claims submitted in the defendant's
federal habeas corpus petition had been procedurally
defaulted in the course of state court proceedings.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, in
vacating the district court's judgment and remanding for
first instance consideration of Skipper's claims on the merits, held that: (1) federal collateral review was not foreclosed
as to the twenty-one claims that the defendant raised on
direct appeal, but did not raise in his motion for appropriate relief in state court;27 (2) the state supreme court's decision granting the defendant's petition for certiorari was a
relevant decision to consider in determining whether federal courts were procedurally barred from reviewing federal claims that the defendant had raised in his motion for
appropriate relief attached to the petition for certiorari;'
and (3) the state supreme court's decision granting the
defendant's petition for certiorari for the limited purpose of
denying the relief requested in his appended motion for
relief did not foreclose federal collateral review of the seven
29
claims raised in the appended motion.

2

-1d. at 608. The district court did not find relevant to its
inquiry the decision of the state supreme court rejecting on defendant's direct appeal all of the twenty-one federal claims not later
raised in the motion for appropriate relief to be relevant to its
inquiry.
26Id.at 608.
"Skippe, 130 E3d at 611.
281d. at 611.
29

1d. at 613.
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ANALYSIS/APPU1CATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

Review of Procedural Default Doctrine

The doctrine of procedural default is rooted in the
principle that federal courts will not consider on collateral review of state court criminal convictions, a federal
claim which the state courts have dismissed on an "independent and adequate" state ground, including procedural default under state law.0 Applying this principle can be
problematic, especially if the basis for the state court
decision is not clearly stated, or even worse, not even
mentioned.The Skipper court offered the following principles as guidance in determining whether a procedural
default has occurred.
First, when addressing the issue of procedural
default, the relevant state court decision is "'the last state
court to be presented with the particular federal claim'"
in question.3 ' Second, if the state court decision was primarily based on or "'interwoven with'" federal law, then
there is a presumption that the decision did not rest on
an independent state law ground. 2 Third, for a claim to be
procedurally barred, the state court must have actually
applied a procedural bar, and not just had the opportunity to do so. 33 Fourth, if a state court dismisses a claim on
both the merits and an independent and adequate state
law ground, then the claim is barred from federal habeas
review. 4 Fifth, if a state court decision is completely
grounded on an independent state procedural default
ground, then that ground has to be "a constitutionally
'adequate' one," in that it must be a "'firmly established
and regularly followed state practice."35
In applying these principles to its inquiry, the Skipper
court emphasized the importance of distinguishing the two
sets of claims at issue in this case.36With regard to the twenty-one direct appeal claims, the court found that the state
supreme court was the last state court to which these
claims were submitted, and that the state supreme court
denied all of these claims on the merits.37 Therefore, this
first set of claims was not procedurally barred from federal

"Id.at 609.
"Skipper, 130 E3d at 609 (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501
U.S. 797,801 (1991)).
-21d. at 609 (quoting Coleman v.Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,739
(1991)).
33
1d. at 609 (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327
(1985)).
"Id. at 609 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10
(1989)).
3
Skipper, 130 E3d at 609 (quotingJames v. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341,348-49 (1984)).
-Id. at 609.
3
11d. at 611.The court determined that the district court
did not regard this direct appeal decision of the state supreme
court as the relevant decision concerning these particular federal claims. The district court had initially looked to the state
supreme court's order denying the seven federal claims as being
3

habeas review.
Similarly, the court found the seven federal claims
in Skipper's motion for appropriate relief to be ripe for
federal collateral review, in that, based on the language
of the state supreme court decision and the procedural context of its entry, the decision was not based on an
adequate and independent state law ground. 38To determine the basis for this decision, the court asked
whether "'it fairly appear[ed] that [it] rested primarily
on federal law or was interwoven with federal law, that
is [whether we have] good reason to question whether
there is an independent and adequate state ground for
the decision.' 9 In applying this standard, the court
looked at the text of the state supreme court decision,
the procedural posture of the decision and factually
relevant precedent. The court found the procedural
posture of the decision to be the determining factor.
The state supreme court had two distinct issues before
it: (1) Skipper's challenge to the superior court's procedural bar order; and (2) the federal claims asserted in
the motion for appropriate relief.4" To reject Skipper's
procedural bar challenge, the state supreme court had
only to deny the petition for certiorari which directly
challenged that order. 41 If the state supreme court
rejected the petition, "that denial would also necessarily reject, as properly procedurally barred, the federal
claims sought to be presented for decision on the merits."42 However, in actuality, the state supreme court

granted the petition for certiorari which had challenged the procedural bar order. Consequently, the
court of appeals reasoned that the state supreme court
did in fact "consider" federal claims which it would not
have reviewed if they were procedurally barred on the
sole basis argued by the State. 43 The court of appeals'
interpretation of the effect of the state supreme court's
decision was, "that it rejected the only basis urged by
the State for finding these federal claims procedurally
barred and, in then "considering" the federal claims not

being the relevant decision. However, uncertain of this choice,
the district court turned instead to the state superior court's
order as potentially being the "last reasoned" decision.The district court concluded that both decisions had found the federal claims procedurally defaulted. The court of appeals disagreed
with this conclusion, and conversely held that, "the relevant
decision is that of the state supreme court, and that it rejected
the federal claims on the merits, not on grounds of procedural
default.' Id. at 611.
Skipper, 130 E3d at 613.
1d. at 611 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,739

39

(1991)) (alterations in original).
'O1d. at 612.
4
'id. at 612.
4
Skipper, 130 E3d at 612.
43
1d. at 612.
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so procedurally defaulted, necessarily considered them
44

on the merits."

RI. Skipper's Lessons beyond Procedural Default
Although the decision in Skipper mainly turns on procedural issues, capital defense counsel can glean some
important practice points from it. First, defense counsel
should submit findings for inclusion in the court order.The
court's decision in Skipper and the court orders associated
1Id. at 612. In interpreting the effect of this decision, the
court of appeals factored in a certain long-standing practices of
the state supreme court. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
had a history of almost automatically denying petitions for certiorari where claims of procedural default were being upheld.The
court of appeals found no reason why the decision here did not
follow that pattern.

-
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with it were evidence of how ambiguous court orders can
lead to misunderstandings of what has and has not been
considered by reviewing courts. Second, this decision is in
some ways a"wake-up" call to district judges, saying that the
procedural bar is not going to be accepted summarily each
time it is used to foreclose a claim. The court of appeals
fairly emphatically expressed dissatisfaction concerning the
lower court's hasty dismissal of all claims under the guise of
procedural default. Defense counsel can use the court of
appeal's discontent with such result-oriented jurisprudence
to argue that in order for a claim to be procedurally barred,
there must be a clear showing that the claim was rejected
on an "independent and adequate" state ground.
Summary and analysis by:
Mary K. Martin

WATKINS v. ANGELONE
133 F.3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998)
United States Court Of Appeal, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On May 26, 1988,Wiflliam McCauley was found dead on
the floor of his Allied Services store in Danville, Virginia.
Witness information lead to the arrest of Ronald Watkins
shortly thereafter.Watkins was tried and convicted of capital
murder on September 28, 1988 and sentenced to death that
same day. Watkins' post-sentencing motion entitled "Motion
and Memorandum to Prohibit Imposition of the Death Penalty
on Grounds of its Arbitrary and DiscriminatoryApplication in
Violation of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution' 2 was denied after a hearing.
On direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,Watkins
asserted racial discrimination in jury selection.3 Stating that

'Watkins v.Angelone, 133 E3d 920 (4th Cir. 1998).Watkins is
an unpublished disposition.According to Fourth Circuit Local Rule
36(c), "citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except
for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and
requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the
Fourth Circuit' The full opinion can be found at Watkins v.
Angelone, No. 97-9, 1998WL 2861 (4th Cir.Jan. 7, 1998).AUI subsequent citations to Watkins in this paper will use this electronic
database citation.
2
Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2(citing J.A. at 220).
3
Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *3.The court of appeals stated
that:
[o]n direct appeal Watkins argued that he was entitled to a
jury matching the racial composition of the community.The
Virginia Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that
Watkins made"no contention that the jury selection process
was unlawful and makes no showing of any policy of, or
effort toward, systematic exclusion" of blacks ....

Watkins had made no showing that the jury selection
process had been unlawful, the Virginia Supreme Court
rejected this argument,4 and the United States Supreme
Court denied his petition for certiorari.Watkins' subsequent
petition for state habeas corpus was denied; both the
Virginia Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari. 6 Watkins petitioned the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging that racial discrimination
occurred in the selection of his jury, that his trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance, and that he was incorrectly
denied his right to inform the sentencing jury that a life sentence would mean a minimum of twenty years in prison.The
district court denied the writ, and Watkins appealed to the
United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit. 7

Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2 (quoting Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53, 238 Va. 341, 346 (1989)).
However, in the immediately preceding paragraph, the court of
appeals itself summarized Watkins' post-sentencing motion as
asserting that "the jury was racially biased due to unlawful exclusion of blacks from the jury pool' Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *2
(emphasis added). Setting aside the issue of whether Watkins
proved the systematic exclusion of blacks, in the court of appeal's
own words Watkins did argue that such exclusion occurred.
Despite this apparent contradiction, the court of appeals did not
reject the finding of the Supreme Court of Virginia.
'Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50, 53, 238 Va. 341,

346 (1989).
5

Watkins v.Virginia,494 U.S. 1074 (1990).
Watkins, 1998 WL 2861, at *3.
7
1d.
6

